Crescat Scientia: Journal of History, Volume I, 2003

              Volume I
Utah Valley State College
Journal of History
Spring 2003
U T A H V A L L E Y S T A T E C O L L E G E
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Crescat Scientia
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Mailed manuscripts should be sent to:Crescat Scientia c/o Dr. Keith
Snedegar, Utah Valley State College Department of History and Political Science,
800 West University Parkway, Orem Utah 84058. Call (801) 863-8487, Fax (801) 863-
7013.
Crescat Scientia is an annual publication of the UVSC Department of
History and Political Science. Issues are available for distribution during the Spring
semester of each academic year. To obtain subscription information or to obtain
back copies of Crescat Scientia contact the Editor-in-Chief, or the History
Department.
© 2003 Utah Valley State College Department of History and Political Science. All
rights reserved.
General Guidelines for Submission
For students interested in submitting a manuscript for review and possi-ble
publication, the following guidelines provide an overview of the requirements.
For more specific information, please contact the UVSC History Department or visit
the History Department’s web page.
To submit a manuscript: provide a complete version of the paper, includ-ing
a cover sheet, with desired alterations already made. Editors will check for
spelling errors and layout problems, not for substantial revision opportunities. It is
strongly suggested submissions be written in accordance with the Turabian style of
citation. The cover sheet should have a running head, author’s name, permanent
street address, email address, and a phone number. The body of your manuscript
must have no markers which may identify the author (IE: name, class, professor
etc). Submit a hard copy as well as one copy of the paper on disk. The disk ver-sion
of your paper must be in Microsoft Word®. On a separate sheet of paper, pro-vide
a brief biographical sketch of yourself including things such as the degree you
are working toward, previous degrees received, future plans (graduate school,
work), awards the paper has won, other areas of personal interest, etc.
Please deliver your paper, disk, and biographical information, sealed in a manilla
envelope, to the History Department addressed to:“Editor-In-Chief, c/o History
Department RE:Academic Journal Submission”
Works submitted must be thematically concentrated in the discipline of
history. Length of submissions may be anywhere between 5 and 100 pages and
must not previously have been published.
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Crescat Scientia
UVSC Journal of History
Editor-in-Chief
Jacob Nathaniel Sommer
Editing Staff and Jury Management:
Assistant Editor
Thomas Parker Mesaros, Jr.
Production and Layout Editor
Michael B. Frye
Associate Editors
Karen E. Neubert
Jacquie A. Neilson
Diane E. Stewart
Faculty Advisor
Dr.Keith Snedegar, History Department Chair
Published Annually for the Utah Valley State College Department of History
and Political Science
Office of the Editor-in-Chief
Utah Valley State College, Department of History and Political Science,
800 West University Parkway, MS 185, Orem, Utah 84058.
Phone: (801) 863-8487. Fax: (801) 863-7013.
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Department of History and Political Science
The Department of History and Political Science encompasses the dis-ciplines
of archaeology (the study of human behavior for the last two mil-lion
years), geography (the study of earth and its life), history (the study of
the record of humankind), economics (the study of the theory and evolu-tion
of different economic institutions), and political science (the study of
political institutions and their impact on the life-style of human beings). In
keeping with the College mission, the History and Political Science depart-ment
is dedicated to providing students with a broad range of opportuni-ties
and experiences. Classes are taught in ways that foster critical thinking
and analysis of complex issues and materials through lecture, reading, class
discussion, and the development of written- and oral-presentation skills.
The department strives to provide a reflective,multicultural and interna-tional
perspective.
The Department of History and Political Science is currently under the
direction of Department Chair,Keith Snedegar. The department is under-going
a tremendous growth spurt and is pleased to welcome new faculty
Dr. Kathren Brown and Dr. Jonathon Moore to the already in place faculty
of Dr. Masoud Kazemzadeh, Dr. David Wilson, Dr.Alex Stecker, Dr. Lyn
Bennet, Oscar Jesperson, Dennis Farnsworth, JaNae Brown Haas, and
Lyndon Cook. The department is also excited to be in the process of
searching for new faculty, and is awaiting a new home in the Liberal Arts
Building, currently under construction.
School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences
The School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences (HASS) is current-ly
under the direction of Dean William W. Cobb, Jr. and offers a variety of
programs and courses of study to help students increase their understand-ing
and appreciation of life.
Graduates from the School of HASS gain knowledge and skills that pre-pare
them well for entry into the workplaces of the 21st century or for
transfer to other institutions of higher learning. HASS majors may pursue
successful careers in their specific disciplines or may use their degrees to
enter such professional fields as law, business, medicine, or government.
There are many Bachelor’s and Associates degrees, as well as certifi-cates
offered to achieve the mission of Utah Valley State College. There are
currently twelve Bachelor of Arts/Sciences degrees offered in the school of
HASS. They include: Behavioral Science, Psychology Emphasis, Sociology
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Emphasis, Social Work, English, History, Philosophy, English Education,
History Education, Integrated Studies, Philosophy, and Art & Visual
Communications. Additionally, there are five Baccalaureate programs under
development. These programs are Dance, Music Performance, Political
Science, Spanish, and Theatre. The school offers ten Associate of
Arts/Science emphases, as well as 5 Associate of Applied Science Degrees,
three minors, and two certificates.
Utah Valley State College
The year was 1941 and the nation was slowly recovering from the
depression of the 1930s. The shadow of war was creeping closer and the
need for arms and ammunition by the allied forces demanded skilled
craftsmen. Many citizens had benefited from the federal work programs
during the depression but needed more training to qualify for better jobs.
Vocational classes were taught at various shops and business throughout
Utah and Heber Valleys under the direction of the State Vocational Office.
In the fall of 1941, under the direction of Hyrum E. Johnson, the voca-tional
training courses from Utah and Heber Valleys were moved to a cen-tral
location in south Provo. The College was located at 1101 South
University Avenue, the former Utah County Fairgrounds and present-day
East Bay Business Park. The county commissioners agreed to allow the
school to occupy several buildings and the Rock Canyon Civilian
Conservation Corps buildings that the federal government had turned over
to the county.
After World War II, 90 percent of the school’s budget was lost with the
cancellation of the war production training funds. A bill was introduced in
the 1943 Utah Legislature in an attempt to make the school a state-sup-ported,
two-year vocational school. The bill was approved in the House
but defeated in the Senate. Cutbacks occurred and fewer classes were
offered until the College received a $50,000 operation costs appropriation
for 1945-47. The appropriation had been strongly opposed by the two-year
colleges and the two universities because it posed a threat to the money
they received from the legislature. In 1947, the school received funding as
a permanent state institution.
During the summer of 1945, Hyrum Johnson was given a leave of
absence and following a short transitional period,Wilson W. Sorensen, for-mer
College purchasing agent,was appointed acting director, and in 1946
as director. Sorensen was instrumental in obtaining a new site at 1300
North University Avenue. The site was purchased by Provo City, Utah
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County, and Provo, Nebo, Alpine, and Wasatch school districts with the
understanding that the state would finance the building of the college
facilities. In 1952, the state appropriated $4,000,000 for the first phase of
the Provo Campus. The complete facility was built in three phases and not
complete until 1963. The campus was designed for 1,200 students. In
1961, enrollment was nearing 1,000 students; however, by 1971, enroll-ment
had ballooned to nearly 2,000.
Growth brought many changes to the College. During the Sorensen
years, the name of the college changed several times to reflect its changing
role. In 1963, the name was changed from Central Utah Vocational School
to Utah Trade Technical Institute. In 1967, the name became Utah
Technical College at Provo, as the College was first given the authority to
confer associate degrees.
Demand for more space sent college officials searching for more land.
One Hundred and eighty-five acres of farmland were purchased in south-west
Orem adjacent to the then new Interstate 15. State funds built the
Business and Auto Trades Buildings, while student funds were used to build
the Student Center. To complete the first phase of the campus a $1.5 mil-lion
federal grant was secured to landscape the grounds. The buildings
were dedicated in March 1977. A Learning Resource Center and Trades
Building were soon added to the campus as soon as the State made funds
available.
In 1982,Wilson W. Sorensen retired after 41 years of service, 37 years
as president of the College. J. Marvin Higbee, former president of Snow
College,was named to be the third president of the College. President
Higbee took the challenge of broadening the image and scope of the
College. Primarily he worked to broaden the primary vocational role to
the community college concept. During Higbee’s five years as president,
he and his staff reached out to all facets of the community by offering
many educational opportunities. In 1987, the name was changed by the
legislature to Utah Valley Community College to reflect the broadened
scope of the College.
The campus continued to expand under the direction of President
Higbee. Not only were there major building projects, which included the
Administration Building, Science Building, and the Activity Center, but also
many educational programs were added to help the College keep pace
with the local demand. President Higbee also emphasized the need for
community support of the institution by focusing the efforts of the
Development Office, Utah Valley Community College Foundation, and the
Alumni Association on community involvement.
Kerry D. Romesburg was appointed president in 1988. President
Romesburg spent much time analyzing the needs of the students and
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directed his efforts toward filling those needs. With the student in mind,
President Romesburg initiated the conversion of the College to a semester
calendar, the first state school to do so. In addition, under Romesburg’s
direction, emphasis on international education, arts and humanities, and
short-term training was instilled throughout the curriculum. Romesburg
retired at the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year. Dr. Lucille Stoddard
will be Interim President until May of 2003. Dr.William Sederburg will
become President of Utah Valley State College in May of 2003. Campus
expansion includes the completion of the Administration Building, addi-tions
to the Library and Student Center, Liberal Arts Building, and voter-approved
funding for a special events center on the Orem campus.
Utah Valley State College is a state college comprised of two interde-pendent
divisions. The lower division embraces and preserves the philoso-phy
and mission of a comprehensive community college, while the upper
division consists of programs leading to baccalaureate degrees in areas of
high community demand and interest. Utah Valley State College is dedicat-ed
to providing a broad range of quality academic, vocational, technical,
cultural, and social opportunities designed to encourage students in attain-ing
their goals and realizing their talents and potential, personally and pro-fessionally.
The College is committed to meeting student and community
lower division and upper division needs for occupational training; provid-ing
developmental, general, and transfer education; meeting the needs for
continuing education for personal enrichment and career enhancement;
and providing diverse social, cultural, and international opportunities, and
student support services.
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Acknowledgments
Initiating a publication with the magnitude such as this, has been an
extraordinary effort in many ways. When first approached about the proj-ect,
Dr.William W. Cobb Jr., the Dean of Humanities, Arts, and Social
Sciences, offered encouragement and wise counsel. Since that time, finan-cial
support has come from Dr. Cobb, Dr. Elaine Englehardt, Interim
President Lucille Stoddard, and Dr.Keith Snedegar the Department Chair of
History and Political Science. To the many other faculty members, stu-dents,
and departments delivering the support and means to make this
publication possible.
Thank you.
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Crescat Scientia
UVSC Journal of History
VOLUME 1 SPRING 2003
CONTENTS
Editors Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Jacob N. Sommer 1
Property Rights, Constitutions,
and Corporate Law in Economic
Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dr. Kathren Brown 3
Bundling: Colonial Courtship’s
Path of Least Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Georgia Buchert 25
The Worthless West:The Fate
of the American Desert in the
Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Adam Eastman 31
Understanding America’s
History with Racism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kathy McCloud 45
The Teutonic Knights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Angela Mickiewicz 55
The Beatitudes:An
Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dr.Alexander T. Stecker 65
Effects of the New Deal on
American Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ryan J.Vogel 73
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81
Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
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Editor Notes 1
Indeed, whenever our exacting Western society...begins to doubt
itself, it asks whether it has done well in trying to learn from the
past, and whether it has learned rightly.1
~ Marc Bloch
Across several centuries the human story has captivated the atten-tion
and interest of millions. Evidence in grand scale tells the stories of
those who have spent lifetimes pursuing the study of history. In fifth cen-tury
BC, Aristotle was engaged in the study of social structures and forma-tion
of governments. Petroglyphs carry the tales of ancient historians
recording small fragments of an extinguished local culture. And tiny pieces
of turtle shell bear inscriptions of a vibrant, but primitive China. Methods
of doing history have changed over time, and modern philosophies have
nudged the discipline toward a more professionalized effort than in previ-ous
decades. Yet it still holds the firm attention of many willing pupils.
In its contemporary application, the historical method presents
the historian with difficult questions. Why study history? Can we really
learn from history? Do people even need history? And if so, whose histo-ry
should be written and for what purposes? Is history a science? Is it
merely propaganda?2 Still, amid the debated tenets, the observant and
determined historian will find that the study of history also offers abun-dant
insight and knowledge.
In the twenty-first century, communities both domestic and for-eign,
are interacting with each other as never before. This interaction
brings both advantage and inevitable conflict. But history, fraught with the
gems of knowledge, provides valuable perspective and understanding. It is
in this sense that the study of history is essential. Bringing individuals,
even entire communities, to an appreciation of difference, is merely one of
history’s many virtues. In the words of the noted historian Marc Bloch;
“Misunderstanding of the present is the inevitable consequence of igno-rance
of the past.”3
The title of this publication is Crescat Scientia. Translated from
Latin, it is an imperative which means,‘may knowledge increase.’ As the
founding editor, it is my expectation that this scholarly venue will provide
just such an increase. A perpetual outlet for students and faculty to con-tribute
insight, discernment, and understanding, for our collective benefit.
Simply,Crescat Scientia is a concerted effort to increase knowledge and
solidify the academic process of understanding. Indeed, through the con-tinual
study of history, our knowledge will increase.
Jacob N. Sommer
Editor-in-Chief
1 Marc Bloch,The Historian’s Craft (Toronto:Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 1953), 6.
2 Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob,Telling the Truth About History (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1994), 4.
3 Bloch, 43.
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In any comparative study it is important that the author avoid superfi-cial
similarities and differences. This is especially true when comparing
Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States due to the large number of
differences among these nation-states. Poor comparisons may lead readers
to believe that a particular factor warrants more attention than another,
possibly more vital, factor. Furthermore, investigating several major differ-ences
would be a multi-volume work. Differences among Russia, the
Soviet Union, and the United States are many and noted. To reduce confu-sion
and present the most fundamental differences, this comparison focus-es
upon three political factors that also affected the economies: private
property, constitutional systems, and laws regarding corporations. These
political differences contributed to the economically distinctive ways that
the nation-states developed.
I chose to focus on these after looking at the literature on politics and
economic growth. Major differences among the three nation-states are
traceable to basic political conditions that reflect the interactions between
society and government and among individuals. Private property rights
affected how economic and social transactions occurred. They allowed
people to become involved in the economy. They determined wealth and
defined who could participate in the political process.
Constitutions, written or unwritten, outlined roles that governments
played in their societies and politics. Furthermore, they defined social,
economic, and political relationships, by defining and guaranteeing the
rights and obligations of individuals and the government. Constitutions
came out of legal traditions and enforced rules regarding private property
and organization. They usually determined how the government or indi-viduals
could act in politics, society, and the economy. Local, provincial,
and national governments created corporate laws to further refine the
rules of the market. Laws on corporations determined how entrepreneurs
Property rights, Constitutions, and
Corporate Law in Economic Development
By: Dr. Kathren Brown
4 Crescat Scientia
could interact with the government and each other. The laws also demon-strated
the roles that the governments assumed within the economies. The
governments often altered corporate laws more easily than they changed
constitutions. Modifications to accept changes in property rights often
evolved due to industrialization and modernization.1
This article concerns each nation-state’s concept and systems of prop-erty
rights, constitutions, and corporate laws. I discuss them in descending
order, beginning with property rights and ending with corporate law.
Property rights, being the most basic rights determined in a nation-state,
are difficult to alter, while corporate laws are relatively easy to change. I
will show that these political factors have economic effects, including
influences on tariff policies. By delineating the rules of economic behav-ior,
property rights, constitutions, and corporate laws determine the roles
of the government and private sector in the economy and, therefore, how
the creation of tariffs can proceed. By outlining these factors, I will
demonstrate that these three political conditions influenced economic
modernization.
Private Property
Private property rights, one of the most significant conditions for the
creation of a stable capitalist system, allow individuals to own and use
their property in ways benefiting them.2 Individuals often assume proper-ty
rights over the goods and services that they possess.3 As individuals,
they cannot protect their property from confiscation. Poorly defined or
unenforced property rights can create expensive transaction costs. Thus,
individuals may band together, pooling their property, to reduce their
risks.4 Thus, they often establish governments to define and enforce prop-erty
right structures.5 Governments enforce differing property rights sys-tems,
however, and this affects economic conditions in their nation-states
long before their economies modernize.6 For individuals or corporations
to have the security to take the risks necessary for investment and eco-nomic
growth, government must assure them that their property is safe
1 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 52.
2 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz,“The Property Rights Paradigm,” Journal of Economic
History 33 (March 1973), 16.
3 North, Institutions, 33.
4 Ibid., 33-34.
5 Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1981), 17.
6 Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 29.
Property Rights 5
from arbitrary confiscation and other expensive transaction costs.7 As eco-nomic
historian Douglass North points out, nation-states having arbitrary
governments often have poorly developed property rights and, therefore,
inefficient economies.8 A well-defined system of property rights developed
early in the United States, but never fully matured in Russia or the Soviet
Union.
Furthermore,well-defined property rights allow owners to engage in
economic specialization.9 Private property rights, with their inherent con-ditions
for technological change, can increase opportunities for economic
specialization.10 For example, a farmer may focus his land, labor, and other
resources on a highly demanded crop or animal, earning him more income
than if he grew a diverse number of subsistence crops or animals.11 The
profits the farmer receives from selling his specialized crops may buy
necessities and luxuries that he does not produce. He could also reinvest
profits into the farmstead or save for future improvements.
Having secured possession rights, in conjunction with other condi-tions,
such as decentralized decision-making, a large internal market, and a
large production potential,Americans pursued a capitalist course.12
Pluralistic societies—societies having several and diverse economic, social,
and political groups such as America—can encourage economic develop-ment
more easily than restrictive societies.13 The United States had a long
tradition of stable,well-defined property rights. Before independence,
colonial property rights were similar to English property rights; the
monarch or local governments could confiscate property only by using the
law.14 These laws also extended to movable and urban property. The
Constitution of 1787, the Bill of Rights, and the Fourteenth Amendment
recognized the right of individuals, and later organizations, to own and use
property that could only be confiscated under certain legally defined con-ditions.
Nonetheless, at times the United States government and those of the
states ignored property rights. After the Civil War (1861-65), not only did
Congress disenfranchise those who had taken up arms against Washington,
7 North, Structure and Change, 6.
8 North, Institutions, 52.
9 Ibid., 34.
10 North, Structure and Change, 164.
11 James M. Buchanan, Property as a Guarantor of Liberty (Cambridge: The University Press,
1993), 19.
12 Martin J. Sklar, The United States as a Developing Country: Studies in U. S. History in the
Progressive Era and the 1920s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 48.
13 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1995), 346.
14 Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 11, 12.
6 Crescat Scientia
but it also expropriated their lands and businesses. In the following
decades, these practices expanded to include non-belligerents. In Munn
versus Illinois (1877), the Supreme Court decided that if the public had a
“definite and positive” interest in an enterprise, the government had the
right to regulate the enterprise. Chief Justice Waite opined that,“When . . .
one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest,
he, . . . grants to the public an interest in the use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the inter-est
he has thus created.”15 In the late nineteenth century, local, state, and
national government used and expanded this decision to expropriate lands
from individuals so that businesses could construct railroads, mills, and
other enterprises that served the public good.16 State legislatures,
Congress, and the courts argued that expropriating land could increase the
wealth of the original owner by giving him access to better transportation
or cheaper food prices.17 After 1910, however, Congress less frequently
expropriated property, though state governments continued to condemn
properties necessary for public projects, such as building roads.18
As the Industrial Revolution gained strength, markets expanded and
technology advanced. Factory owners found it easier to specialize produc-tion
and built their industries upon particular items: steel, textiles, luxury
goods, and other goods.19 Instead of catering to general needs, such as a
blacksmith who produced nails, horseshoes, and repaired metal objects for
a local market, entrepreneurs with advanced technology began to produce
a large amount of one item for a larger market, such as nails, providing the
market demanded their goods.20 Though retaining their foundation in earli-er
property rights, new property rights evolved, involving not only land
and immovable goods, but also movable goods such as income and
stocks.21
Russians did not have the same private property rights as Americans.
Furthermore, peasants, making up more than eighty percent of the popula-tion,
22 did not hold land in similar patterns throughout Imperial Russia.
Independent peasants farmed in the Baltic region and Poland while com-munal
land-holdings dominated in Russia. The strongly centralized govern-
15 Paul C. Bartholomew and Joseph F. Menez, Summaries of Leading Cases on the Constitution
(Totawa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), 66-67.
16 Harry N. Scheiber,“Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government:
The United States, 1789-1910,” Journal of Economic History 33 (March 1973), 240.
17 Ibid., 237-38, 243.
18 Ibid., 249.
19 North, Structure, 165.
20 North, Institutions, 119.
21 North, Structure, 190.
22 R.W. Davies, ed., From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy: Continuity and Change in the
Economy of the USSR (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 11.
Property Rights 7
ment restricted the creation of property rights because ultimate authority
in property rights definition lay with the government.23 This contributed
to poor agricultural development and a backward form of economic mod-ernization
because those who worked on the property could not make
decisions in their best interests.
Before emancipation, serfs cultivated the properties of their landlords
and peasant communities. Each family had at least one plot near its cot-tage
to grow necessities. The households possessed these plots perma-nently,
though they did not own them in a written, legal sense. Peasants
also owned strips of land that they farmed for their families. Permanent
title to these strips infrequently existed.24 In 1861,Tsar Alexander II began
to liberate the majority of Russia’s peasants from serfdom, but emancipa-tion
changed land-holding patterns little because peasants did not receive
clear, individual titles to lands.25
Though Alexander emancipated millions of peasants, he and the
Minister of Internal Affairs failed to institute land reform that would have
given independent land parcels to peasants. Instead, the village received
the land for collective distribution and use and Russian peasants continued
to farm communally.26 After emancipation, peasants did not receive inde-pendence
from their former landlords or the government, but continued to
exist in an entrenched system of enforced patron-client relationships.27
These relationships left peasants beholden to their communities and their
landlords, often unable to act in their economic or social self-interest.28
Each community established a series of behavioral norms with strong
penalties assigned to violators.29 This subjugated the peasants and further
prevented them from engaging in independent activities.30
Furthermore, peasants had to pay their former owners for the property
that the community received. Each family had to pay a part of the indem-nity:
often the indemnity was higher than the value of the land. The high
payments for the land to their former landlords kept peasants from freeing
themselves from landlord control.31 Many landlords required peasants to
23 Richard Wortman,“Property Rights, Populism, and Russian Political Culture,” Olga Crisp and
Linda Edmondson, editors, Civil Rights in Imperial Russia (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), 15.
24 William E. Butler, Russian Law: Historical and Political Perspectives (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff,
1977), 185.
25 Steven L. Hoch, Serfdom and Social Control in Russia: Petrovskoe, a Village in Tambov
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 117.
26 Hoch, 117.
27 Ibid., 133.
28 Ibid., 118.
29 Ibid., 160.
30 Ibid., 189.
31 Butler, 183.
8 Crescat Scientia
give a certain number of days’ labor or money until they paid for their
land.32 According to Russian historian Alexander Gershenkron, taxes and
payments to landlords reduced the opportunity for peasants to reinvest
any profits (if they had any) and increase their production.33 Thus, Russian
grain outputs grew at between 1.5 and 2 percent a year, though approxi-mately
one-quarter of this growth contributed to an increase in sown area
and a less determined amount sustained a population increase.34
Significantly, without well-defined property rights peasants could not effec-tively
use land and improve general agriculture.35
Heads of household did not own land in a written legal sense. A vil-lage
assembly could confiscate or redistribute strips as it saw fit, though
the frequency of redistribution varied from region to region.36 Most vil-lages
exempted household plots from redistribution. Varying by region,
communities distributed lands according to the number of male, and some-times
female,“souls” in a household.37 According to legal historian William
Butler, large families and the need to divide land into smaller parcels creat-ed
the main reasons for communal land holding, before and after the
Emancipation of 1861. Because the Russian peasantry lacked the tradition
of primogeniture, land allotments shrank each time the parcels passed to a
new generation.38 Land redivision rectified the problem by taking strips
from small families and giving part of them to larger families. In most
cases, redistribution was complicated: it required the approval of two-thirds
of all village households.39
Government officials, including finance ministers Vyshnegradskii
(1887-1892) and Sergei Witte (1892-1903), oversaw peasant welfare. They
believed that the government should help peasants remain linked to their
communes. As Gershenkron pointed out, the communal system guaran-teed
each peasant family little more than a plot of land to keep it from
starving and revolting.40 Leaders, though, believed that giving peasants
more property rights, such as those found in America, might expose Russia
to market competition that would destroy Russian agriculture.
Government ministers feared that the peasants would destroy the political
32 Alexander Gershenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of
Essays (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 119-20.
33 Ibid., 122.
34 Peter Gatrell,The Tsarist Economy, 1850-1917 (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1986), 100.
35 Gershenkron, 122.
36 R.W. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S.G.Wheatcroft,The Economic Transformation of the
Soviet Union, 1913-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 107 and Butler, 183.
37 Butler, 186.
38 Butler, 186-87.
39 Ibid., 188.
40 Wortman, 19.
Property Rights 9
and social system that dictated Russia’s enrichment if property rights
expanded further.41
Even if the government had undertaken major land privatization, it is
possible that the peasantry would have resisted it. Aleksandra Efimenko
conducted a study of European Russia in the late 1880s. She found that
peasants believed that God gave land to men for them to till in common;
God did not give land to individual families. Peasants often expressed the
desire for more land to till, but they rejected direct ownership. Even when
the government designated private property, as in the case of crown
forests, peasants ignored decrees prohibiting trespassing and used the
land.42
Between 1907 and 1910, Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Stolypin
(1906-1910) attempted to reform Russian agriculture by increasing the
amount of private peasant lands available. Stolypin recognized that pri-vately
owned land produced more than communally held land. In 1914,
peasants living independently of the communal system owned approxi-mately
56 million hectares of land, representing about ten percent of all
European Russian households.43 Such a small number could not provide
the groundwork necessary to build an independent and strong peasantry,
much less the basis of a stable, growing economy as Stolypin hoped. The
assassination of Stolypin in 1910 and gentry resistance to further reform
ensured that private Russian farmers would not dominate agriculture.44
Poorly defined property rights also affected the business community.
The Russian government did not grant the same rights to businesses as it
did to individuals. In contrast to the United States, Russia lacked a modern
system of laws regarding entrepreneurial property rights.45 As late as 1915,
for example, neither the justice nor the finance ministries recognized cor-porations
as individuals.46 The ministries of finance and internal affairs did
not guarantee any individual’s property rights—after all, they had ordered
even the nobility to sell land to peasants during Emancipation.
Furthermore, the government restricted the property rights of foreigners,
Jews, Poles, and other non-Christian Russians, keeping those groups from
participating fully in the economy. Depending upon the situation, the gov-ernment
prohibited such “undesirables” from owning or managing enter-prises
in European Russia.47 The government applied these laws arbitrarily,
41 Wortman, 17.
42 Butler, 180-81.
43 Davies et al., Economic Transformation, 107.
44 Gatrell, 117.
45 Thomas C.Owen,The Corporation Under Russian Law, 1800-1917: A Study in Tsarist
Economic Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 144, 198.
46 Ibid., 183.
47 Ibid., 123, 161, 173.
10 Crescat Scientia
however, resulting in some Jews and Poles owning land and factories.48
Modern property rights associated with capitalism never developed in
Russia due to the tsar’s need to maintain control over the economy and
society.
The arbitrary behavior of the ministries of finance and justice concern-ing
private property contributed to increased investment costs. The
finance ministry also subjected entrepreneurs to long delays for necessary
paperwork. For instance, by the time a corporation petitioned the Ministry
of Finance for a charter and the board of directors received all necessary
permits, months or even years may have passed. This process was too
slow for rapidly changing economic conditions.49 Although this con-tributed
to higher investment and operating costs, the government’s arbi-trary
policies and bureaucratic obstacles did not prevent the growing num-bers
of corporations.50
The revolutions of 1917 promised land reform and new definitions of
property rights. Regions that declared independence from Russia in the
chaotic aftermath of the February and October Revolutions—the Baltics,
Poland, Finland, and parts of the Caucasus—established property rights
based on regional norms. The Provisional Government, replacing the
tsarist government in February, attempted to institute private property
rights such as those in Western Europe.51 The radical Socialist
Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks wanted to take land from landlords and
redistribute the property to peasants or peasant communes.52 In rural
areas that the Provisional Government did not control, committees repre-senting
the Bolsheviks and their allies broke up many large parcels to dis-tribute
to middling or poor peasants. At times, peasants confiscated land-lords’
properties to distribute among themselves without direction from
Bolsheviks.53
The October Revolution began a new phase of property rights redefin-itions.
Marxist ideology and the Bolshevik government’s needs supple-mented
a tradition of ownership restrictions in Russia. Marx believed that
private property ownership, meaning the bourgeois ownership of the
means of production, represented an individualism that exploited the
workers. When Marx discussed private property ownership he meant
bourgeois property, such as factories, mills, mines, transportation systems,
48 Thomas Owen, The Corporation, 155.
49 Ibid., 129.
50 Ibid., 155.
51 Ibid., 182.
52 Alec Nove,An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991 (New York: Penguin Books,
1992), 31-32.
53 Nove, 101.
Property Rights 11
and banks.54 Marx, claiming that private ownership enslaved the masses,
argued against private property because it allowed a political system—cap-italist
democracy—where a minority of owners ruled over a majority of
workers.55 Marx failed to fully address the agricultural aspects of private
property because he, and later socialists, believed that socialism applied
only to industrial urban societies.56 Many socialists never expected Russia
to have a revolution because it lacked a strong industrial economy.57
Nevertheless, when the Russian Socialist Democratic Party (Bolsheviks)
took over the ministries in October 1917, they began to apply their ideas
regarding property rights to agricultural and industrial production.
The Bolsheviks passed a series of decrees and constitutional provisos
that struck against the ownership of private property. The Decree on Land
of November 8, 1917, abolished private land ownership. The Constitution
of 1918 reiterated the prohibition on private land ownership and the
nationalization of all natural resources.58 They intended to redistribute land
to local government organs that would assign land to peasant households
to hold in common. Peasants could till their assigned land, but not own
it.59 Peasants who no longer worked on the land forfeited their right to till
it.60 It must be noted that as with many decrees issued between 1918 and
1920, the Land Decree went unheeded in many places. Government disor-der
allowed some private peasants to retain their land. The Decree
Abolishing Inheritance also discouraged the ownership of private proper-ty.
The decree stated that upon the death of an owner, any households
worth more than ten thousand rubles would become the property of
Russia.61 The Land code prohibited children from inheriting any land upon
the death of their parents.62
The October Revolution also changed the definition of urban private
property. The Bolsheviks defined almost all property as public property,
including large homes, hotels, factories, shops, hired vehicles, banks, and
54 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Ben Fowkes, translator, (New York:
Vintage Books, 1977),57-58.
55 Ibid., 990.
56 Ibid., 452-53.
57 Ibid., 85.
58 Constitution of July 10, 1918, in American Association for International Conciliation,
International Conciliation, (New York: American Association for International Conciliation,
1919), 72.
59 “Decree on the Land, October 26 (November 8 NS), 1917” in Robert V. Daniels, editor,A
Documentary History of Communism in Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev (Hanover,VT:
University Press of New England, 1993), 63-64 and Constitution of July 10, 1918, in American
Association, 73.
60 Butler, 191.
61 “Decree Abolishing Inheritance,” in American Association, 54-5.
62 Butler, 191.
12 Crescat Scientia
even scuba gear.63 Many workers took the slogan “All power to the soviets”
seriously, expelling their private managers, and setting up workers’ commit-tees,
often associated with the Bolsheviks, to run factories.64 Beginning in
April 1918, the Council of People’s Commissars began to nationalize build-ings,
large retail businesses, and factories with five employees or more.65
The Supreme Council of the National Economy administered these new
government properties.66 By removing the ability to own private property,
rural and commercial, and outlawing agriculture’s free marketplace by
denying the right to trade in grain, the Bolsheviks destroyed the foundation
of capitalism.67 At this time, the Council and Commissariats rejected this
“problem” as they intended to remove capitalism from Russia.68
These policies made up the overall agenda of War Communism (1918-
1921). Under War Communism, the Bolsheviks nationalized many indus-tries
and used forced requisitioning to obtain goods and property neces-sary
for them to continue to fight the civil war. In 1920, the Supreme
Council of the National Economy began to nationalize small industries.69
Not only would such actions favor a war victory, Bolsheviks believed, they
would also help to create and strengthen socialism in Russia.70
Nonetheless,War Communism did not stop the disintegration of the econo-my,
widespread industrial collapse, or peasant unrest.71 The Bolshevik lead-ership
discovered quickly that the planned economy of War Communism
failed to supply Russia’s needs, and it decided to reintroduce some form of
private property and limited free-market activities.72
In May 1921, the Council of People’s Commissars instituted the New
Economic Policy (NEP: 1921-28) that allowed a small and regulated private
market to coexist within the larger government-run economy.73 Lenin and
63 Butler, 236 and “Postanovlenie soveta narodnykh komissarov [Decision of the Council of
People’s Commissars]” 17 July 1919 in Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti [Decrees on Soviet Power],
volume V, 1 April - 31 July 1919, (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi literatury, 1971), 291-2..
64 E.A. Rees, State Control in Soviet Russia: The Rise and Fall of the Workers’ and Peasants’
Inspectorate, 1920-34 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987) 4.
65 “Proekt Ianisa Davisovicha Repsona. Ob organizatsii mezhdunarodnago tovaroobmena
[Draft of Ianis Davisovich Repson. Regarding the organization of international trade],” 23
August 1918. RGAE f. 413, op. 2, d. 5, l. 10.
66 Rees, 15.
67 Alexander Erlich,The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960), 77, 81.
68 Butler, 239.
69 Ibid., 236.
70 Erlich, 77.
71 Alan Ball,“Lenin and the Question of Private Trade in Soviet Russia,” Slavic Review 43 (Fall
1984), 399.
72 Alan M. Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists: The Nepmen, 1921-1929 (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1987), xv.
73 Davies et al., Economic Transformation, 9.
Property Rights 13
the Council of People’s Commissars hoped to avoid political upheaval and
to alleviate goods shortages by permitting peasants to sell their produce to
private entrepreneurs and the government. Other private companies and
government-owned factories would produce consumer items and sell them
to the goods-starved peasants in a private market. Taxes levied on all busi-ness
would contribute to government revenue and the government could
further fund state-run industries.74 Lenin declared NEP to be temporary, no
more than a few decades; a period when Russia could step back, take a
breath and then move again towards socialism.75
NEP contrasted sharply with the previous harsh policies of War
Communism.76 As historian Alan Ball points out, the Council of People’s
Commissars reversed the Supreme Council of the National Economy’s
nationalization law of 1920, and returned all factories having fewer than
five employees to their original capitalist owners.77 Small factories and pri-vate
shops reopened, manufacturing many of Russia’s consumer goods and
selling merchandise in the mixed market. Private individuals and organiza-tions
owned many commercial and industrial firms.78 Government-owned
industries produced heavy industrial items and some retail goods. The gov-ernment
retained control over mining, communications, transportation, and
foreign trade.79 To operate, entrepreneurs had to obtain permission from
the Supreme Council of the National Economy and operate within a man-dated
budget.80
During NEP, private property occupied a precarious legal position.81
Bans upon land ownership remained.82 On May 17, 1921, the Council of
People’s Commissars decreed that individuals could establish small produc-tion
facilities or retail businesses and dispose of their goods as they
wished.83 In December, the Council allowed small, nationalized factories to
return to their previous owners.84 The government codified new property
rights in the Civil Code of 1923, but the rights remained vague.85 Central
and local administrations ambiguously defined how capitalist organizations
would exist within a newly socialist society, resulting often in the confisca-
74 Erlich, 85-6.
75 Erlich, 86-7 and Ball,“Lenin,” 402.
76 Ball,“Lenin,” 399.
77 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 128.
78 Ball,“Lenin,” 405.
79 Davies et al., Economic Transformation, 9.
80 Owen, 191.
81 Butler, 255
82 Davies et al., Economic Transformation, 83.
83 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 128.
84 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 129.
85 Ibid., 23.
14 Crescat Scientia
tion of legal enterprises and property.86 Many Communists opposed NEP
due to its ambiguity, fearing the mixed market signified a backslide to capi-talism
and autocracy.87 As opposition to NEP increased after Lenin’s death
in 1924, government officials often used taxation as a form of legal confis-cation,
increasing taxes so that merchants or manufacturers were forced to
surrender their enterprises to the government.88 The Council of People’s
Commissars stated that it wanted commissariats to end bureaucratic pres-sures
upon the private sector, however, pressures intensified throughout
the NEP period.89 Article 30 the Civil Code of 1923 declared that the gov-ernment
would close all businesses “harmful to the state,” and after the
death of Lenin, local and central governments broadly interpreted this arti-cle
to take over many private businesses.90
When the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932) replaced NEP, the Council of
People’s Commissars began to abolish private property ownership and pri-vate
economic activity, though some regions had begun to eliminate pri-vate
trade in 1927.91 Government leaders, including Joseph Stalin, intended
to replace the mixed economy with a centrally planned system.92 To some
Communists, it seemed as if the Politburo had sanctioned a return to the
repressive policies of War Communism to force an increase in agricultural
production.93 The Council of People’s Commissars declared private pro-duction
and free market trade illegal, though market activity continued
throughout the early 1930s.94 Between 1929 and 1932, collectivization
forced many peasants to forfeit their crops, machinery, animals, and person-al
property. The Council of People’s Commissars and local governments
coerced peasants into joining kolkhozy and sovkhozy (government-run
agricultural communes) that held livestock, machinery, and land in com-mon.
95 The Politburo directed the government to forcefully requisition
grain, denying peasants the opportunity of private sale, but hoping to solve
the Soviet Union’s grain crisis.96 The government arrested and exiled or
86 Owen,The Corporation, 193 and Butler, 237.
87 Ball,“Lenin,” 400.
88 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 74.
89 Ibid., 140.
90 Ibid., 23.
91 Ibid., 162.
92 Moshe Lewin, Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates: From Bukharin to the
Modern Reformers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 97.
93 Erlich, 98 and Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of
Collectivization (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968), 221.
94 Erlich, 111.
95 Nove, 160.
96 Erlich, 176 and Lewin, Russian Peasants, 356.
Property Rights 15
executed many resisting peasants, private traders, and large-scale producers
during the period.97
By 1932, the government had renationalized most factories and enter-prises
and collectivized a large percentage of agriculture. Individuals could
not own any means of production, including private dwellings. Decrees
from the Politburo and Supreme Council of the National Economy tried to
eliminate private trade from the economy.98 The Politburo and Council of
People’s Commissars believed that the renationalization of industry and
the collectivization of agriculture would encourage further industrial
growth by creating surpluses that could be sold to create investment capi-tal
for government-owned industries.99 During the chaos of renationaliza-tion
and collectivization, private property existed only as one’s most per-sonal
belongings. Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Communist Party,
had no intention of setting up a pluralistic democracy or capitalism, there-fore,
private property rights mattered little. Furthermore, Stalin wished to
rid the Soviet Union of independent, capitalist factions.100 By renationaliz-ing
most forms of private property, Stalin and his advisors determined the
rules of economic and political exchange.
Constitutional Developments
Formal constitutions, written or unwritten, embody a nation-state’s
political traditions and norms. They are a record of the most basic rules
that govern politics.101 Constitutions vary by country, reflecting the civil
society. Constitutions guarantee rights, including the rights of individuals
to become involved in politics and economics.102 Often, constitutions
demonstrate property rights. Laws on economic interaction, such as cor-porate
laws, have their basis in constitutions.103 Because constitutions
often contain these most basic rights that reflect social norms, they are dif-ficult
to change, in contrast to statutory laws.104
Until February 1917, an autocratic tsar ruled Russia. Nonetheless,
Russian legal systems changed significantly between 1880 and 1917. While
lacking a constitutional system comparable to that of the United States,
during the late nineteenth century Russia progressed towards a more open
97 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 162.
98 Lewin, Russian Peasants, 374, and Lewin, Political Undercurrents, 97.
99 Lewin, Russian Peasants, 401, Nove, 154, and Erlich, 103.
100 Nove, 157.
101 North, Institutions, 4, 47.
102 Cohen and Arato, 226.
103 Ibid., 226.
104 North, Institutions, 47.
16 Crescat Scientia
legal system. The Ministry of Justice recognized the equality of individuals
under the law and moved towards a jury system. Regardless of changes,
tsars, including Nicholas II, saw themselves as the dispenser of laws—as
God’s representatives to the Russian people. Having this divine right, tsars
and many of their subjects saw the monarchy as the legitimate source of
all laws.105 Nonetheless, as time wore on, liberals, socialists, and anarchists
began to publicly question the authority of the tsar and called for political
change. The question of autocratic rule remained unresolved after the
Revolution of 1905 and the establishment of Russia’s first written constitu-tion.
As threats to the autocracy appeared, pro-monarchist theorists increas-ingly
defended it. Mikhail Katkov, a major ideologist of autocracy in the
late nineteenth century, argued that autocracy was a progressive political
system because it gave power to an individual who represented all Russia,
not individuals or a class. He claimed that Russians did not have to worry
about self-interested lawyers or legislators ruining Russia with their own
political aims as they did in the West.106 Apologists for autocracy claimed
that tsardom represented true freedom because it liberated Russians from
political chaos. Under this system no group could politically check the
behaviors of the tsar or limit government actions.107 Thus, the tsar ruled
Russia absolutely.108 Other Russian political theorists, including the anar-chist
Mikhail Bakunin, monarchist Dmitrii Shipov, and socialist Georgii
Plekhanov, criticized Western political and legal systems as bourgeois; rep-resentatives
reflected only the mindset and needs of the wealthy merchant
class.109
Before the Revolution of 1905, the Russian “de facto constitution”was
the Security Law of 14 August 1881, a temporary emergency measure that
lasted until 1905. It arose in response to terrorism against government
officials in the 1870s.110 The Security Law codified decades of laws and
procedures that the government, not the citizenry, created. It limited the
civil guarantees and judicial reforms of 1864. For example, a new law
allowed courts-martial to try political crimes. Civil rights remained limited
to protect the autocracy from political challenges.111
105 Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1992), 29.
106 Ibid., 47.
107 Wortman, 21.
108 Walicki, 40-41.
109 Walicki, 58.
110 Jonathan W. Daly,“On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia,”
Slavic Review 54 (Fall 1995), 602.
111 Ibid., 605-7.
Property Rights 17
The growth of liberal political views in the late nineteenth century did
not immediately challenge the autocracy. The highest levels of government
remained relatively untouched by liberal ideas, though some liberals held
offices.112 The Revolution of 1905, however, demonstrated that the tsar
could not rule in 1905 as he ruled in 1805. The rise of labor unions,
increased numbers of peasant revolts, and student demonstrations had
changed the political climate of Russia.113 New political ideas influenced
many people, but the bureaucracy and gentry retained their traditional hos-tility
to liberal ideas.114 Liberals demanded that the government release its
choking grip on society and the economy and establish a popularly elected
legislature to rule with Nicholas II.115 The government-sponsored massacre
in St. Petersburg in January, the assassination of Grand Duke Sergei
Aleksandrovich in February, and continued political unrest in the spring
and summer of 1905, spurred Nicholas to declare a manifesto and series of
edicts that created a constitution (the Fundamental Laws) and legislative
assembly (the Duma), guaranteed civil rights, improved public access to
government ministers, and admonished Russians for criticizing the war
against Japan.116 Although these laws greatly expanded civil rights and
access to the political process, Nicholas alone had the power to change
the Fundamental Laws and to approve any legislation; thus the Duma
remained powerless. Nicholas remained, in title, the “supreme autocratic
power.”117
The Fundamental Laws stopped most challenges to Nicholas’ power.
The Duma might have passed laws, but the tsar had to approve them
before they could take effect. He retained all executive power. He pos-sessed
complete control over Russia’s foreign affairs, directed the army, and
could declare martial law in any part of the country for any reason. He
could dismiss the Duma and act as supreme judge. The Russian people
received the freedoms of assembly, speech, organization, movement, and
conscience. Importantly, the Fundamental Laws declared property to be
inviolable. Only the government could condemn it; citizens had to receive
compensation for any lost property.118 Due to continued unrest, Nicholas
placed many areas under martial law. Many Russians never experienced
112 Tim McDaniel,Autocracy, Capitalism, and Revolution in Russia (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988), 106.
113 McDaniel, 104 and Don C. Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6, 11.
114 Albert Levin,The Second Duma: A Study of the Social-Democratic Party and the Russian
Constitutional Experiment (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), 5.
115 McDaniel, 106.
116 Rawson, 14 and Levin, 11.
117 Levin, 14.
118 Ibid., 14-15.
18 Crescat Scientia
the new freedoms won in 1905. As a result, demands calling for further
limits upon tsarist powers continued even after World War I broke out.
The February Revolution promised a new, liberal, and constitutional
regime: minimal government involvement in society and the economy and
a government structure based on popular representation. Many in the new
government hoped to include the upset workers and soldiers and industri-alists,
intellectuals, and former administrators.119 The Provisional
Government included many of Russia’s leading liberals—Alexander
Kerensky,A.A.Kornilov,V. I.Vernadskii—and some socialists. Reform efforts
remained limited, however, due to the chaotic conditions created by World
War I and government confusion. The powers of the Provisional
Government ended in October 1917 when the Bolsheviks and their allies
grasped control of the central government apparatus.
As with the February Revolution, the October Revolution suggested a
new constitutional order. Although Bolsheviks believed that they had to
promote the withering away of the state, the Bolsheviks presented their
first constitution on July 10, 1918.120 The constitution, also called the
Fundamental Laws, enumerated the rights of the government and citizens.
The leadership claimed that their government took into account the needs
of the proletariat and not those of the bourgeoisie, therefore, the new gov-ernment
was a democracy.121 Similar to the Fundamental Laws of the
tsarist government, the constitution came from the government, not from a
popular convention. Many Bolsheviks believed that the constitution
should represent the fusion of mass organizations, such as unions and sovi-ets,
with the administrative structures of government. Furthermore, the
constitution would combine legislative and executive functions. Through
this type of constitution, Lenin believed that the government would better
serve the workers.122
The American Constitution of 1787 reflects the coalition of traditional
popular political movements. Influences included state constitutions
drawn up after independence from Great Britain in 1776 and the Articles
of Confederation of 1777.123 During the 1787 Constitutional Congress, rep-resentatives
strongly debated the extent of powers that the new federal
government should hold. When the Congress of the Confederation and
119 William G. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic
Party, 1917-1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 53.
120 Piers Beirne, editor, Revolution in Law: Contributions to the Development of Soviet Legal
Theory, 1917-1938 (Armonk,NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), 24.
121 M. Iroshnikov,D.Kovalenko, B. Shishkin, Genesis of the Soviet Federative State, (1917-
1925) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), 6, 8.
122 Beirne, 87-9.
123 McDonald, 262 and Michael Kammen,The Origins of the American Constitution: A
Documentary History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), xi.
Property Rights 19
states approved the constitution after 1787, they accepted a limited gov-ernment
where citizens possessed ultimate authority.124 The constitution
limited the national government to a few roles: defense, levying and col-lecting
duties, borrowing money, regulating commerce between the United
States and foreign nation-states, naturalization, issuing money, creating laws
on counterfeiting, establishing post offices, promoting the sciences and
“useful arts,” establishing courts, defining piracy and other felonies, declar-ing
war, raising armed forces, regulating land, ruling the national capital
directly, and making “all laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-rying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any depart-ment
or officer thereof.”125 When the delegates created the Constitution of
1787, they intended to give ultimate authority to the citizens. The Ninth
Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights, states that Congress had no rights
except those given to it by the citizens of the United States.126
To maintain a degree of flexibility, according to Article Five states or
the Congress could propose new amendments to the constitution. Upon
ratification by states Congress added new amendments to the constitution
to accommodate economic and political changes. For example, the
Thirteenth Amendment (December 1865) eliminated slavery, though earlier
articles and amendments had approved it.127 In conflicts between the con-stitution
and Congressional opinion or the constitution and individual
states, the constitution possessed the final word. Judicial review ensured
constitutional supremacy.128
Corporate Laws and Economic Development
Legislation regarding economic activity clearly demonstrates govern-ment
attitudes towards the market and economic organizations. Laws on
corporate activity regulate types of enterprises, where firms may locate,
how they may conduct business, and other mandates. Such laws affect the
domestic market by establishing the rules of economic competition.
Corporate laws greatly affected economic activity in Russia, the Soviet
Union, and the United States and either restricted or encouraged develop-ment.
Although capitalism gained strength in Russia in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, laws regarding economic organization
124 Bartholomew and Menez, 408.
125 Ibid., 399-400.
126 Bartholomew and Menez, 408.
127 Ibid., 409.
128 McDonald, 254.
20 Crescat Scientia
changed slowly in the shadow of economic growth. During this time, as it
had traditionally, the Russian government saw the economy as its ward.129
Tsar Nicholas I liberalized laws on incorporation and established stock
exchanges in 1839, but a large-scale reform of economic laws had to wait
until the February Revolution of 1917.130 Old laws meant for an agrarian
society contributed to expensive start-up and operation costs, forcing
Russian industries to lag behind those of the West where incorporation
fees, administrative costs, and taxes were comparatively low.131
The government made some superficial movements towards modern-ization
such as the creation of land mortgage banks that made loans to
landowners and the aristocracy, as did the Nobility Bank, or gave credit to
buy land and resold purchased land to peasants, as under the Peasant
Bank.132 In November 1905 tsar Nicholas II created the Ministry of Trade
and Industry to promote industrial interests.133 The finance ministry spon-sored
several congresses to discuss the needs of industry.134 Little legisla-tion
benefiting corporations came out of these congresses, however, and
Russia’s capitalism remained primitive compared to that in the West.
In the late nineteenth century, Russian legislation attempted to regu-late
competition by outlawing monopolies, cartels, and syndicates.
According to economic historian Thomas Owen, the Criminal Code of
Russia promised jail for any persons who united to control the trade of
food and other products.135 Nonetheless, syndicates appeared in the sugar,
metals, textile, and mineral trades, among others, as directors bribed offi-cials
or otherwise skirted the prohibitions.136 An iron syndicate,
Prodameta, and coal syndicate, Produgol’, arose and flourished in the early
twentieth century to maintain stable, high profits and limit competition in
these sectors.137
The abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917 marked the appearance of
the liberal Provisional Government. Most industrialists believed that get-
129 Owen,The Corporation, 79.
130 Thomas C.Owen, Capitalism and Politics in Russia: A Social History of the Moscow
Merchants, 1855-1905 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9.
131 M. I.Tugan-Baranovsky,The Russian Factory in the 19th Century,Arthur Levin and Claora
S. Levin, translators, (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.), 306-07.
132 Gregory Guroff and Fred V. Carstensen, Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the
Soviet Union (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 129 and Arcadius Kahan, Russian
Economic History: The Nineteenth Century, Roger Weiss, editor, (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1989), 53.
133 Owen, Capitalism, 108 and McDaniel, 118.
134 Guroff and Carstensen, 135;Owen, Capitalism, 108, 138.
135 Owen,The Corporation, 133.
136 Owen,The Corporation, 133, and Gatrell, 178, 182, 184.
137 Owen,The Corporation, 133-35; Gatrell, 177; and Susan P. McCaffray,The Politics of
Industrialization in Tsarist Russia: The Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers, 1874-
1914 (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 162-63.
Property Rights 21
ting the autocracy out of politics would result in increased industrial pro-duction
and a more stable economic exchange. Made up of many industri-alists
and other businessmen, such as Alexander Guchkov,A. I.Konovalov,
and M. I.Tereshchenko, the Provisional Government directed the Duma to
reform laws on the economy.138 A few days after the abdication of
Nicholas, the Duma swept away many of the restrictive laws on corpora-tions.
139 The new finance ministry established new regulations for incorpo-ration,
eliminated property requirements, and instituted other new corpo-rate
laws more inclined towards modern capitalism. Areas that seceded
from the Russian Empire also established new corporate laws.140 The term
of the Provisional Government was too short to institute long-lasting
reform, however.
The October Revolution of 1917 ended the liberal, capitalist economic
system of Russia. The Bolsheviks, hostile to capitalism, had not clarified
how they would treat private enterprise. At times they claimed that they
needed to build socialism on the backs of the bourgeoisie, at other times
they claimed that they must eradicate the parasitic bourgeoisie.141 Some
private enterprises operated, though civil war and political chaos made
their survival extremely difficult. During War Communism, as previously
stated, the government prohibited private individuals from setting up
enterprises: meanwhile the Bolsheviks nationalized many large industries
and forced many large businesses to fold.142
NEP changed corporate law again. On April 10, 1923, the Supreme
Council of the National Economy decreed that corporations could operate,
provided they remain within prescribed financial limits. Lenin decided to
control and direct the market, but not to directly control it.143 Thomas
Owen points out that corporations had to receive special government per-mission
to set up, a condition familiar to them under the tsars.144 The
Council enacted other laws similar to those of the tsarist period. The
Council of People’s Commissars had to approve any special charters, the
government determined capitalization and share price minimums, the
People’s Commissariat of Finance defined the operations of small banks,
the government ignored differences among varieties of joint-stock compa-nies,
and the finance ministry heavily taxed private firms and required
businesses to pay high licensing fees.145 These reforms ended in 1928,
138 Guroff and Carstensen, 187.
139 Owen,The Corporation, 190.
140 Ibid., 189-90.
141 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 1.
142 Owen, Capitalism, 191 and Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 7.
143 Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 28.
144 Owen, Capitalism, 191.
145 Owen, Capitalism, 192 and Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists, 29.
22 Crescat Scientia
when the Soviet Union moved from a mixed economic system to a central-ly
planned economy.
After the American Civil War, the United States entered a period of sub-stantial
economic growth, assisted by modern laws, particularly at the state
level, regarding corporations.146 As the American economy developed and
matured, local, regional, and higher courts accepted and enforced a rela-tively
laissez-faire economy, continuing Congress’ hands-off economic poli-cy.
Congress possessed a small role in the economy, having only the pow-ers
to regulate interstate commerce and trade with foreign nation-states,
issuing money, borrowing funds, and establishing and collecting customs
duties.147 Federal laws regulating corporate behavior did not appear until
the late nineteenth century.
In the late nineteenth century, laws regarding corporate activity
increased, particularly in the areas of taxation, credit and banking, and
organization. Nonetheless, laws on corporate regulation remained minimal
because of a tradition of restricted government and well-defined individual
rights.148 Laws, such as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, that prohibited trusts,
cartels, and monopolies arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Woodrow Wilson and other government leaders believed that
such combinations restricted competition and threatened American capi-talism.
They believed that anti-trust laws would right such shortcomings.149
Although more laws on economic activity appeared, neither Congress nor
state governments wanted to neither regulate nor control business closely.
Congress did not want to disturb business and potentially threaten the
growing economy. The presence of pro-business interest groups in
Congress made sure that few controls would appear.150
Conclusion
Systems of property rights, constitutions, and laws on corporations
affected economic interaction and, therefore, the rate of modernization.
Russia, having an autocracy, a government-created constitution, and lack of
modern economic laws, lagged behind the West economically, thus the gov-ernment
had incentives for expanding its involvement. The Soviet Union,
plagued by chaos and political struggle in its earliest years, created a con-stitution
and strict laws that limited private economic activity. The elimina-tion
of many forms of private property ownership and strict laws on prop-
146 Sklar, 14.
147 Bartholomew and Menez, 399-400.
148 Sklar, 29, 76.
149 Ibid., 108.
150 Ibid., 126.
Property Rights 23
erty ownership further hindered economic development because investors
had no incentives. Nonetheless, due to intense government efforts and
investment and a limited private market, Russian industry recovered to
1913 levels by 1926. The economy continued to expand after the end of
NEP, but it was at the expense of millions of lives and the economic well
being of the Soviet consumers. The development of a laissez-faire govern-ment,
strong and consistent property rights, a flexible written constitution,
and corporate laws that kept up with the needs of business contributed to,
comparatively, the enrichment of Americans and the US economy.
U T A H V A L L E Y S T A T E C O L L E G E
1 9 4 1
“Americans have always been distinguished for making money and
for trusting their daughters.”1 Bundling was an odd customer of courtship
widely employed by rural colonial Americans. It was a clear demonstration
of the victory of self-interest over virtue. Considerations of reputation and
chastity were frequently laid aside by all concerned parties-daughters, suit-ors
and parents-in favor of unsanctioned gratifications, the securing of mar-riage
contracts, pre-marital assurances of the ability to produce offspring,
and family economy.
As bundling is no longer a broadly recognized convention, a definition
will be helpful to begin this study. Noah Webster wrote that to bundle is
“to lie in the same bed with one’s sweetheart without undressing…”2 This
description, while accurate in theory, leaves questions in the mind of the
reader, gaps in understanding which both proponent and opponent would
hasten to fill. This paper concerns itself with the opinions of the latter, but
first, what more is there to generally introduce this revolutionary system of
wooing?
Apologists have described bundling as “a system of behavior which
was at once adequate, effective, and entertaining, while remaining consis-tent
with legal practice and religious conviction…a normal routine, as
unquestioned and consistent a procedure for courting couples as is the
modern automobile ride.” It was “an experiment in pragmatic romance,”3
an “honor system,”4 to which numberless settlers subscribed to during
Bundling: Colonial Courtship’s
Path of Least Resistance
By: Georgia Buchert
1 Doten,D.The Art of Bundling.The Art of Bundling: Being an Inquiry into the Nature and
Origins of that Curious but Universal Folk-Custom, with an Exposition of the Rise and Fall of
Bundling in the Eastern Part of North America.1938. Chapter 1.
2 Webster, Noah. Bundle. In Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English
Language, Unabridged. Second Edition. USA:William Collins + Word Publishing Co., Inc. 1978.
241
3 Doten, Chapter 1.
4 Doten, Chapter 7.
26 Crescat Scientia
long, harsh winter months.5 A young man, at the end of his workday, trav-eled
an often-tedious distance to the home of his darling. There, he passed
light conversation with her parents and siblings until the appropriate hour
for slumber arrived, and the family retired. Rather than sit up and make “a
great waste of lights and fuel,” suffer the chill of the night, or endure a
reluctant and arguably early parting, the young pair, with the approval of
the daughter’s parents, ventured to bed together, clothed to the point of
family serenity. Their intimate resting spot was sometimes in a room
where the entire family slept, space being at a premium, but often, the
young woman had her own separate quarters, and the sweethearts enjoyed
a setting of seclusion. The girls’ mother often saw to it that the innocents
were warmly and securely arranged, or perhaps they were left to their
own devices to get themselves comfortably bundled.6 The expectation
was that “nothing untoward would happen;” this being believed to be the
case, the parents left the pair undisturbed, to converse freely, whisper ques-tions,
confess tender self-disclosures, and grow better acquainted through-out
the night.7 Advocates insisted that the “morally honest [who] wanted
to live according to the Christian and moral standards of the day…would
[in bed] be safest from falling into evil ways.”8 A pointed pro-bundling ser-mon,
the indignant response to a harassing public burlesque,was delivered
in the ballad,“The Whore on the Snow Crust,”well known by the latter
1700s. It assured skeptics that
Since in bed a man and maid/ May bundle and be chaste.
It doth no good to burn up wood, It is a needless waste.
Let coat and shrift be turned adrift, And breeches take their flight,
An honest man and virgin can, Lie quiet all the night.
Since bundling is not a thing,That judgment will procure;
Go on young men and bundle then, But keep your bodies pure.9
Bundling was considered by those who indulged in the custom to be a log-ical,
straightforward, and wholesome way for young people to interact
with one another, the most sensible alternative available during the forbid-ding
months between autumn and spring.
Was bundling, in truth, such a sterling pastime? Was the love of virtue
strong enough in most colonial youth to enable them to resist feather bed
allurements? The answer to both of these questions is no. History shows
that “the implicit understanding that the couple would avoid a sexual
encounter was not always honored.” This was illustrated by a study con-
5 Weis,D.L. Basic Sexological Premises. 28 May 2001. Humboldt University at Berlin. [database
online] Retrieved 23 October 2002.
6 Doten, Chapter 1.
7 Dugan, J. 2001. Kissin’ Cousins. 26 February 2001. Retrieved 23 October, 2002.
8 Aurand, 25.
9 Stiles, H.R. Bundling; Its Origin, Progress and Decline in America. New York: Book Collectors
Association, Inc. 1934.101.
Bundling 27
ducted in mid-18th century Massachusetts, which revealed that a third of
the brides of the day were pregnant at the time they uttered their nuptial
vows.10 Certainly, many bungling bundlers accounted for these errant statis-tics.
Dr. Henry Reed Stiles, author of the first treatise on bundling, quoted
this satire from Washington Irving’s History of New York, describing the
“curious device” used by Connecticut’s “sturdy barbarians [to] keep up a
harmony of interests and promote population:”
They multiplied to [an incredible] degree…This amazing increase
may, indeed, be partly ascribed to a singular custom prevalent among
them…bundling- a superstitious rite observed by the young…with
which they usually terminate their festivities…This ceremony
was…considered as an indispensable preliminary to matrimony; their
courtships commencing where ours usually finish, by which means
they acquired, that intimate acquaintance with each other’s good
qualities before marriage, which has been pronounce by philosophers
the sure basis of a happy union…To this sagacious customer…do I
chiefly attribute the unparalleled increase of the…Yankee tribe; for it
is a certain fact…that wherever the practice of bundling prevailed,
there was an amazing number of sturdy brats annually born unto the
state, without the license of law, or the benefit of the clergy.11
It was not rare for bundling to result in the free exercise of self-interest,
rather than a measured study of self-restrained virtue; in fact, bundling was
a common tarnish to the morals of the day.
Despite the often-fruitful multiplication of consequences, colonials
held to a common opinion that bundling itself “was not contrary to
Discipline or Scripture,”12 and argued that it was virtuous as exercised by
pure individuals, so they continued to justify its practice. The settlers
feared God, professed a belief in The Word, and asserted a deep reverence
for chastity, and yet they were trapped in paradox; as with people in most
other ages and lands, their “popular morality” didn’t correlate with their
standards of religion.13 Puritanism was obsessed with sin, and its neurotic
leadership antagonized not only temptation, but also open pleasure.14
Harsh Puritan doctrines and fiery threats of damnation communicated to
colonials a picture of virtue that refused them the satisfaction they sought,
as well as a persuasive reason to lay aside self-interest. Bundling proved to
be a form of passive rebellion, a withdrawal of certain citizens’ allegiance
to a heavy-handed clergy. Early Americans relied heavily on the excuse
that:
10 Weis.
11 Stiles, 50-52.
12 Doten, Chapter 7.
13 Doten, Chapter 8.
14 Doten, Chapter 7.
28 Crescat Scientia
In ancient books no knowledge is, Of these things to be got;
Whether young men did bundle then, Or whether they did not.
Since ancient book says wife they took, It don’t say how they courted;
Whether young men did bundle then, Or by the fire sported.15
For decades, it was contended that there was no harm in bundling, and
that the innocent and true transgressed no laws, either of God or of man,
by participating in it. Yet, who was true?
Was there a benefit great enough to offset the danger in the experi-ence
of bundling? What made this mode of courtship seem worthwhile to
all parties involved, when the rule of restraint was not observed and natu-ral
consequence followed? The answer can only be: marriage. Bundling, in
one way or another, by integrity or falsehood,was intended as a means to
that end.16 If the lady bundler happened to become pregnant, unless her
swain was an authentic rascal, then the couple’s downy experiments gen-erally
ended in “downright wedlock”.17 This was often a glad arrangement
for a young woman in early America, for the stigma-laden standard of spin-sterhood
was set between the ages of 22 and 27, depending on the area of
the colonies in which she resided, and an old maid was not looked upon
with favor.18 Marriage held the key to a woman’s greatest perceived securi-ty,
and many of the fair sex clung to the fearful opinion: “For how can she
e’er married be, If bundling be refused?”19 A young woman’s virginity
often seemed to her a reasonable trade for companionship, the hope of
prosperity, and the validating eye of society.
Like his gentle partner, a young man stood to gain what he prized
most highly in exchange for his pledge of abstinence. From the outset,
bundling saved him from having to trudge home late on bitter nights.
Later, bundling which led to the altar spared him the bachelor’s tax, which
was levied in some parts of the colonies. Much more than this, it ushered
in the wedded state, which was not considered an optional, but a sought-after
blessing, as a wife typically brought love and respectability into the
bargain, along with her dowry.20 What did it matter, then, to a decent
young man, if a sacramental ceremony was necessarily expedited? For the
Puritans, marital union held great religious and social value, and it was
encouraged and rewarded with solemn approbation, as long as the cou-ple’s
sins were kept from ministerial view.21 Lastly, with an investment of
naught but time and the careless pleasure-seeking, a young man could try
15 Stiles, 99,100.
16 Stiles, 136.
17 Stiles, 33.
18 Dugan.
19 Stiles, 107.
20 Dugan.
21 Weis.
Bundling 29
the fertility of his intended before promising a lifelong commitment; for
some forward-thinking swains, bundling became a raw test of:“Show me
first, and I’ll marry you afterward.”22 What did a young colonial man
believe he had to forfeit in the bundlers’ bed? For some, chastity was of
small import, as if there was “nothing to lose, and everything to gain.”
What was at stake for the parents of a bundling girl? There was the
family’s concern over fuel consumption: lights and wood. If lovers stayed
up into the night courting, the winter fuel store would be used up faster.
It has been suggested by some researchers that saving wood was not so
much a necessity as it was an excuse for parents to wink at the habits of
bundlers beneath their roofs.23 There were, however, other matters of
economy to consider. A marriage was a business arrangement and was a
choice seldom left to the young to decide alone. The parent’s purpose and
ideal was to “make a good match.” A successful pairing meant not only
happiness for the daughter, but also-and perhaps especially- an increase of
wealth for the family, and so it was a matter of deliberation. Typically, a
daughter could not begin the process of courtship without her father’s
consent.24 A father’s eye was upon each potential coupling, and his was
the right to approve or to disallow. Extreme examples of parental
deal-making have been recorded; some Yankee families advertised having
eligible daughters, by placing a lighted candle or two in a window, as a
welcome sign to would-be suitors.25 While some parents may have sincere-ly
believed that their own generous expressions of trust in their daughters
and their swains, along with familial investments of religious training,
would fortify the bundlers with strength to hold fast to their purity, it
seems impossible that most were actually blind to the tender dangers and
irreversible lapses of chaste behavior which they consented to by default.
Those parents, it seems fair to say, willingly traded their children’s virtue
for increase and security.
As long as colonial American-young women, and their parents, prized
their own self-interests above the virtues defined by their professed ideals
and the faith they embraced, and while parental responsibility to protect
their children went unchecked by the laws of the land, the strange custom
of bundling thrived and made many sorry victories. The honor system
largely failed. Morals and often reputations were willingly, even eagerly,
exchanged for comfortable commodities of the pocket, the home, and the
heart, goods that were more admirably won by others of the same time
period, couples and families who were more balanced in their answers to
the questions of integrity.
22 Aurand, 22.
23 Aurand, 7.
24 Dugan.
25 Aurand, 10.
U T A H V A L L E Y S T A T E C O L L E G E
1 9 4 1
At the heart of western America lies the thriving metropolis of Salt
Lake City on the rim of the Great Basin. Fifty miles to the west, lies the
Goshute reservation of the Skull Valley Band. Located well into the desert
of the Great Basin, the reservation is surrounded by polluting neighbors. It
is part of a vast area declared the West Desert Hazardous Industries Area by
Tooele County. It is also a part of an even larger unofficial Sacrifice zone1
designated by the U.S. Government and its military complex. Following
what it saw as an established pattern, some members of the Skull Valley
Band of the Goshute Tribe chose to seize an opportunity to cash out their
chunk of the worthless West. That decision transformed their small por-tion
of worthless land into a highly valuable, politically loaded controversy.
And, while that decision immediately caught the attention of their neigh-bors
to the east in Salt Lake, it is in reality just a small act in the colossal
unfolding drama of the nuclear age being played out on the stage of the
inter-desert West. Finding solutions to the ongoing issues of wasted dispos-al
requires a better understanding of the history of this region.
As the United States (U.S.) grew and spread across the continent dur-ing
the nineteenth century, the American West was seen by many to be a
great desert.2 There were however politicians, industrialists, and oppor-tunists
who saw the West as a vast region of resources that needed to be
harvested, mined, extracted, and developed. As the century drew to its
close and through the beginning of the twentieth century, however, there
was an entire region that these conquerors had not been able to exploit,
the inter-desert region. It is comprised of the five major North American
deserts, the Great Basin, Mojavean, Sonaran, Navajoan, and Chihauhian.
These great western deserts remained an unsolvable riddle, a worthless
The Worthless West: The Fate of the
American Desert in the Twentieth Century
By: Adam Eastman
1 Williams,Terry Tempest, Refuge,An Unnatural History of Family and Place (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1991).
2 Early nineteenth century maps labeled much of the West The Great American Desert.
32 Crescat Scientia
land that defied developers and bureaucrats to make it productive. They
viewed the region as a vast, sterile, infertile, useless wasteland, unfit for
human civilization.
As the twentieth century progressed, the developers and the oppor-tunists
finally found a use for the useless land. The author and advocate for
this new use was the United States Army. During World War II the Army
needed to find places to develop, build, and test new weapons in secrecy,
isolated from threat of foreign attack. They turned their eyes to the West.
There they found in the openness of the inter-desert region the seclusion
and privacy needed to develop their new weapons. Equally important,
they also located vast tracts of land that could be used to test their
weapons. The criteria, uninhabited (really, sparsely inhabited) government
land (really, public land) that had no other use. Test sites and proving
grounds were mapped throughout the region.
These vast military reservations of the west were not created out of
nothingness. There was, of course, human habitation of all these lands.
Native Americans have inhabited the deserts for thousands of years.
Archeologists believe the Western Shoshone have lived in the Great Basin
for at least 12,000 years.3 By not taking into account the history of the
Indian occupation of this land -an alternative history of millennia long
human occupation-Euroamericans have become accomplices in postcolo-nialist
practices that have always erased presence.4
In the late nineteenth century, the Mormons created over 300 settle-ments
throughout the region. But because both Indian and Mormon settle-ments
were small and spread over thousands of square miles the land was
still seen as virtually uninhabited by military planners and government sci-entists.
Or, it might be more exactly described in their words as Inhabited
by a low use segment of the population.5 They relegated it in their minds
to the Indians, the Mormons, and anyone else stupid enough to choose to
try and live there.
During World War II quick decisions were needed. The world was at
war. In these conditions the decision that parts of the west could be sacri-ficed
was an easy one to make. But these quick decisions to build tempo-rary
facilities became a permanent legacy. The post war military complex
saw a need to expand the defensive powers of the nation against the new
threat of nuclear war with the Soviets. These temporary facilities became
permanent and were expanded again and again to meet the needs of larger
3 Williams,Terry Tempest, Refuge,An Unnatural History of Family and Place (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1991), 184.
4 Kuletz,Valerie,The Tainted Desert (New York:Toutledge, 1998).
5 Gallager, Carole,American Ground Zero,The Secret Nuclear War (Cambridge, MA:The MIT
Press, 1993), xxiii.
The Worthless West 33
and larger weapons.6 More and more land was sacrificed as the nuclear
and military test zones grew.
Traditionally, the first sacrificial test zone to come to mind when dis-cussing
weapons testing is the Nevada Test Site. This is where the United
States military and the Atomic Energy Commission (later the Department
of Energy) detonated 1100 nuclear bombs above and below ground
between 1951 and 1992. In the Great Basin, the Army laid claim to an
enormous tract of land to create another Zone of sacrifice, the Dugway
Proving Ground, thirty miles from Skull Valley. It is the Army’s primary
location for testing biological and chemical weapons. Numerous open air
tests using highly toxic chemicals, such as Nerve Agent and pathogens as
dangerous as Anthrax,were conducted.7 Dugway was a candidate in 1951
for the atomic test site eventually located in Southern Nevada. While it
was spared the blast of atomic bombs tested in Nevada, it was home to its
own nuclear experiments. In 1995 President Clinton called for an investi-gation
of Intentional environmental releases of radiation. This investigation
revealed many previously undisclosed tests. Among the list was testing of
radiation warfare ballistic dispersal devices at the Dugway proving
grounds.8 About seventy known radiation dispersal tests were conducted
there. One test in 1959 was conducted to determine the effects of the
crash and resulting fire of a nuclear powered plane. Eight small nuclear
reactors were intentionally melted down releasing the equivalent of
10,000 times that released at Three Mile Island.9
During the time the government was pushing forward with its Atoms
for War program, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) also developed
Atoms for Peace. In reality, the two programs could not be separated.
Hoping to ensure a steady supply of weapons-grade plutonium (a byprod-uct
of nuclear fission energy from commercial nuclear reactors), the U.S.
government launched, in 1951, a policy of promoting commercial nuclear
power that - although nuclear power has become less popular in the
United States- remains with us today. K.S. Shrader-Frechette in her book
Burying Uncertainty reveals, Commercial nuclear fission began, and was
pursued, only because government leaders wanted to justify continuing
military expenditures in nuclear-related areas and to obtain weapons-grade
plutonium.10
In addition to unleashing the power of the atom,World War II left
another legacy. It was a time of unquestionable patriotism when finding
6 Kultez., 63.
7Ward, Chip, Canaries on the Rim, Living Downwind in the West (New York:Verso, 1999), 100.
8 Kultez., 246.
9 Ward., 110.
10 Kultez., 17.
34 Crescat Scientia
fault with the government was not just unpatriotic but treasonous. This
feeling lasted long after the war ended. The pride of victory was soon
replaced by Cold War fears and hysteria. But even had dissent been con-ceivable
for the average American, the popular opinion of all but those
who lived in the inter-desert region was that the deserts of the West were
wastelands.
The characteristics of the desert must be considered if they are to be
used for the disposal of hazardous materials. In actuality it is inappropriate
to think of these arid ecosystems as waste lands of no value, or to interpret
their apparent barrenness as a lack of complexity. The human failure to
recognize and properly manage the complexity of arid and semiarid
ecosystems has resulted in a loss of productivity of these already marginal-ly
productive lands.11 Unfortunately this attitude is still not one that is
widely held today. The effects of the propaganda purveyors have petrified
public perception. Today, there are still many who are quick to advocate
that the deserts are disposable. They are a wasteland whose only redeem-ing
value is the disposal of waste.12 In the 1980’s the commissioners of
Tooele County, Utah, located in the Great Basin Desert of Utah and Nevada
created the WDHIA (West Desert Hazardous Industries Area) in an effort to
cash in on the increasingly profitable waste industry. They saw it as an
opportunity for more jobs and revenue in exchange for pollution of unus-able
land.13
Waste industry projects benefit from the desert environment due to the
lack of population, competing land uses, and hence public and political
opposition. There are even some in the scientific community who support
the use of deserts for reasons other than politics and population. When
these factors are put aside, they claim desert ecosystems appear to be well
suited for service as the final host to hazardous chemicals and radioactive
wastes. Lack of water, which speeds erosion and acts as a pathway for
contaminant migration, fewer competing land uses, reduced population
pressures and generally slower biotic processes all argue in favor of using
deserts rather than other ecosystems for disposal projects.14
Responding to this claim, historian Valerie Kuletz argues that putting
all the waste in the interdesert region may seem a reasonable solution
from a certain scientific, practical, and even political point of view, this
viewpoint is based on an ideological foundation that has its roots in the
11 Charles C. Reith and Bruce M.Thompson, eds., Desert As Dumps? The Disposal of
Hazardous Materials in Arid Ecosystems ( Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1992), 21.
12 Anderson, Jeff, Put Waste on Waste Land, Deseret News, 17 December 2001 (Utah).
13 Ward., 63.
14 Reith and Thompson., 321.
The Worthless West 35
Western scientific technological paradigm, with its ties to a culture of eco-logical
plunder and racial conquest.15 By following this paradigm, the
Tooele County Commission has enlarged the established pattern of sacri-fice
from one of national security to include hazardous waste disposal. In
the past fifteen years several facilities have been built in the new zone.
There are now seven facilities that have been built, including two haz-ardous
waste incinerators, a hazardous waste dump, two chemical
weapons incinerators, a radioactive mining wastes site (now capped), and
the low level nuclear waste dump operated by Envirocare.16
The Envirocare dump currently only receives class A waste, primarily
tailings from uranium mines that have been cleaned up. There are propos-als
being considered to allow the acceptance of class B and C waste.17
While the company slid the project out of the spotlight and onto the back
burner the same day state regulators approved their license, that licensing
process has not slid to a halt. The Utah State Department of Environmental
Quality’s Board of Radiation Control, who oversaw and granted the license
is currently setting hearings for the appeals process.18 Further, Envirocare
has five years to seek legislative and governor approval of its license.19
There is a significant amount of confusion concerning the classifica-tion
of nuclear wastes into low-level and high-level. The distinction does
not reflect the amount of radio-activity but rather the process that created
them. For example, in news stories about Envirocare’s proposal, low-level
waste is stated to be many times less potentially harmful than high-level
waste.20 Taken at face value one would quickly conclude that low level
waste is less harmful. But, in truth, one must first ask what is the signifi-cance
of the word potentially. It is likely that this is a subtle play on
words. Potentially may be used here to indicate the increased risks if the
waste ever melted down or was burned, not the risks of exposure to radia-tion.
21 The reality is that low-level wastes, especially class C and GTC
(greater than C) do, in fact, pose serious, long term risks.
The current classification system was defined by an act of Congress in
the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy act. These classifications do not reflect the
longevity or level of toxicity, as explained by Makhijani and Saleska.
15 Kuletz., 94.
16 Map of area, http://www.downwinders.org/utah.html.
17 Spangler, Donna Kemp, Debate Heats Up Over N-waste Plan, Deseret News, 16 March 2001
(Utah).
18 Minutes from Utah Radiation Control Board meeting, 1 March 2002,
http://www.deq.state.ut.us/EQRAD/drc_hmpg.htm.
19 Spangler, Donna Kemp, Envirocare’s Hot Plan Not Entirely Cold. Deseret News, 12 July
2002 (Utah).
20 Ibid.
21 Fuller, john G.,The Day We Bombed Utah (New York: New American Library, 1984), 89.
36 Crescat Scientia
Thus, the current radioactive waste categorization is in the untenable
situation of sometimes labeling as low-level radioactive wastes those which
are actually several times more radioactive than other streams of radioac-tive
waste, which the current system labels high-level. Many of the longer-lived
and more dangerous categories of low-level waste, which is disposed
of in shallow land burial, is also more radioactive than transuranic waste
which has been designated for disposal in deep geologic repository.22
Situated southeast of Envirocare’s Tooele County facility, that would be
receiving these hotter wastes, is the Skull Valley Band Reservation. They
are living in the sacrifice zone with the low level nuclear waste dump to
the north as well as hazardous waste dumps and incinerators nearby to the
north and east. Surrounded by these polluters, the tribal leadership has
found itself in an interesting position. In 1989 the Office of the Nuclear
Negotiator started looking for a home for a monitored retrievable storage
(MRS) site. Specifically targeting Native Americans at the National
Congress of American Indians, any tribe willing to consider the offer was
promised $100,000 by the Office of the Nuclear Negotiator. Three tribes
seriously considered accepting a facility, the Mesalero Apache in
Southeasern New Mexico, the Fort McDermott Piaute-Shoshone Tribe of
northern Nevada and the Skull Valley Goshute. There are several reasons
why Native Americans were targeted. Small population translates into little
opposition. Sovereign Indian nations are free from the immediate control
of the state and are also outside the jurisdictions of federal agencies like
the EPA.23 Poverty is the main reason for tribes accepting. In the case of
the Goshutes, ninety percent of the tribal income comes from a contract
with Alliant Tech (formerly Hercules Areospace) that allows testing of rock-et
motors on tribal lands. This contract is about to expire.24
When the federal government abandoned the plans for an MRS, utility
companies turned to these three tribes to strike a private deal. When the
facility on the Mescalero Reservation failed because of the discovery of an
earthquake fault running under the proposed site the utilities turned to
the Goshutes. The utilities formed a limited liability company called
Private Fuel Storage and struck a deal with tribal leader Leon Bear.
There are just 112 Skull Valley Goshute Indians. Currently about two
dozen live on the reservation.25 But even within this small community on
the reservation, everyone does not agree with the decision. Today, two dif-ferent
administrations claim to have a mandate to lead the band, one fac-tion
linked to pro-nuclear leader Leon Bear and the other linked to Rex
22 Kultez., 90.
23 Ibid., 106.
24 Ibid., 110.
25 Auer, Catherine,Yes In My Back Yard, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Vol. 57, Issue 4.
The Worthless West 37
Allen, who is softer on the issue. But since the backlog of unsigned paper-work
was getting so immense, in October 2001 and again in March 2002
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) (citing the ongoing dispute over leader-ship)
has said the federal government will continue to deal with Leon Bear
until the band Clearly and unequivocally provides the BIA with evidence
as to changes in its leadership.26
The debate has also affected politics at the Utah State Capitol 50 miles
to the east. For many Utahns, the legacy of living downwind from the
Nevada Test Site hits close to home, including Utah’s governor, Mike
Leavitt. He has mounted a political fight to keep the waste out of Utah.
The state has expended considerable effort, passed legislation, and con-ducted
studies.
Governor Leavitt’s record on nuclear waste, however, is not as solid as
he would have his constituents believe. The record is clear. He is in favor
of granting the permit and license that would allow Envirocare to receive
highly radioactive low-level waste. During the 2002 session of the Utah
Legislature, Leavitt intervened to kill a resolution that would have
expressed Utah’s formal opposition to a permanent disposal facility at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada.27 Further, he voted against Proposition One in
November 2002.
Leavitt cannot claim, therefore, that he is opposed to waste being
shipped through Utah. He also cannot claim his motivation is concern for
the Goshutes. He has never paid any attention to them or helped them
before. He cannot claim it is because of worry over pollution and the envi-ronment.
He has allowed and encouraged incinerators and dumps to be
built in Utah’s deserts. Finally, his motivation cannot be distrust of the gov-ernment
and its scientists. He trusted them enough to allow two chemical
weapons incinerators to be built in Tooele which is much closer and poses
a more immediate threat to Salt Lake City.
In fact, the only official reason that Mike Leavitt has given for oppos-ing
the PFS facility on Goshute land is fear that the temporary site would
become permanent. The word temporary, however,must be placed in con-text.
The definition of a temporary site in this situation means, realistically,
40 years. The NRC is granting a 20-year license with the option to renew
for 20 more. It is hoped that this will give the necessary time for the per-manent
site (officially designated by the Bush Administration and approved
by congress in the spring and summer of 2002) to be constructed at Yucca
Mountain.
26 Johnson, Jerry, BIA Makes Pick For Goshute Leader, Deseret News, 2 April 2002 (Utah).
27 Spangler, Donna Kemp, Utahns Favor N-waste SiteBin Nevada, Deseret News, 1 April 2002
(Utah).
38 Crescat Scientia
The pressure to find a Permanent repository for the waste accumulat-ing
at the power plants in this nation has been growing steadily for the
past twenty years. However, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
have increased that pressure significantly. Policy makers have used the
new threat of a terrorist attack on our nations nuclear power plants, or the
use of nuclear waste to make a dirty bomb to wrap the American flag
patriotically around the issue of Nuclear Waste Disposal. Yucca Mountain,
which was already supported by the nuclear friendly Bush Administration,
took a giant leap and now has become a national priority and an issue of
Homeland Security.
But the pressures of waste accumulation extend beyond the waste
being created in the United States. In order to control all aspects of the
nuclear cycle in the global arena, the U.S. developed an off-site Fuel Policy
from 1964 to 1987 that encouraged the return of highly enriched uranium.
The government entered into agreements with twenty-eight nations to
which it sold uranium fuel. This was done to discourage foreign countries
from stockpiling spent fuel and in an effort to keep plutonium out of the
hands of rogue nations and terrorists that could use it to make nuclear
weapons. Thus, spent fuel will be returning to the United States from at
least twenty-eight countries, through as many as ten ports of entry. One
port cited as an example was the Concord Naval Weapons Station port in
California’s San Francisco Bay Area, one of the most densely populated
regions in the country.28
Many feel that the decision of the Bush Administration to designate
Yucca Mountain as the official site was made prematurely. Others add that
the president has used fears of terrorist attacks the same way that the
Eisenhower Administration used fears of Soviet nuclear attack to build up
the U.S. atomic weapons program at the beginning of the Cold War. Just as
it was during the worst of the open air nuclear weapons testing, once
again, it is becoming unpatriotic to question U.S. policy to increase spend-ing
on development of new nuclear weapons. Included in this threat is
the very real possibility that Bush will end the ten year moratorium on
nuclear tests.
But despite the new emphasis placed on Yucca Mountain, the ques-tions
concerning it are still valid. The worry is not only whether it will
have the capacity, but also if it will actually be built. There are still many
safety questions and objections that continue to be raised. Less than one
month prior to Bush’s recommendation, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) issued a report Urging that the decision [to select Yucca Mountain]
28 Kuletz., 118.
The Worthless West 39
be postponed indefinitely.29 According to the GAO, the DOE still has almost
300 outstanding agreements with the NRC for research that must be com-pleted
before the application to build and operate a facility can be
approved.
Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham responded in a letter to the GAO
calling their review of the project fatally flawed, claiming that it was
assembled to support a predetermined conclusion.30 The Department of
Energy (DOE) undersecretary, Robert Card, criticized that the report
focused on the work that is left to do instead of the twenty years of scien-tific
work that has already been completed.31
The reality is that the DOE is not unbiased on this issue. It has its own
stockpile of waste that is the residue of its research activities, including the
development of nuclear weapons. This is waste that they would like to
transfer to Yucca Mountain. The DOE itself has estimated that it has 378.5
million liters of highly radioactive waste that it is storing.32
It is both sad and ironic that both sides in this debate accuse the other of
supporting predetermined conclusions. It is however, extremely poignant
to note that if anyone is qualified to make the accusation it is the DOE
whose predecessor, the AEC, abused this tactic to convince the public con-cerning
the safety of atomic weapons testing in Nevada. Most likely there
is middle ground in this debate, but because nuclear policy by nature is so
politically polarizing there are very few who will attempt to find or hold
the middle ground.
In a similar manner it is difficult to find the middle ground concerning
the transportation of nuclear waste. Regardless of the outcome of the fight
to keep the waste from being stored in Utah, it is inevitable that it will be
transported through the state in massive quantities if Yucca Mountain is
ever opened. Salt Lake City has been touted as the crossroads of the west.
When it comes to shipments of nuclear waste it will be no different.
Proponents of the project say the transportation is safe. Because the waste
will have to travel through forty states to arrive at its final destination how-ever,
this issue has come under increasing scrutiny. Fears of accidents have
been compounded by fears of nuclear trucks and trains becoming possible
terrorist targets. Certainly the issue of transportation has the largest politi-cal
impact and will be where much of the debates focus when congress
votes to override Nevada’s veto of Yucca Mountain. But try and find the
middle ground. Proponents like Congressman Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho) are
29 Brouwer, Greg, DOE Recommends Yucca Mountain Repository Despite Warnings, Civil
Engineering,Vol. 72 Issue 2 (February 2002) 12.
30 Ibid., 13.
31 Ibid., 13.
32 Ibid., 13.
40 Crescat Scientia
quick to point out the long track record of safe transportation of waste for
the past forty years. Transportation is a ruse. There is no legitimate human
safety argument to be placed with transportation. Angie Howard, execu-tive
vice president of the Nuclear Energy Institute (the utilities Washington
lobbying arm) says that the Yucca Mountain program should be stopped
due to concerns about transportation safety is nothing more than fearmon-gering
for political effect.33
Opponents claim that the transportation of waste to Yucca Mountain
will be a mobile Chernobyl. They predict statistically hundreds of acci-dents
will happen and four to six would result in the release of radiation.
The worst case scenario would be an accident where the shipping cask
cracked and waste mixed with a hot fire such as diesel fuel. This would
contaminate the smoke from the fire and spread the contamination similar
to the fire at Chernobyl.34
Both sides of the debate seemingly offer only one solution to the prob-lem.
Those who are opposed to nuclear waste call for the discontinuation
of nuclear power. The proponents of nuclear power, support disposing of
the waste at Yucca Mountain. But the reality is that both of these solutions
are flawed. The first because it does not solve the problem of the waste
already produced. The second because it does not address the issue of
where to put the waste when Yucca Mountain fills up.
At the root of the problem is the disposable mentality in American cul-ture.
In typical fashion the waste generated is slated for one time use.
Little or no efforts have been made to recycle fuel rods from commercial
reactors in the United States. Another solution to the problem is to
reprocess the fuel rather than dispose of it. Reprocessing is routine in
France and Japan, but in the United States it is currently only carried out
for fuel from the navy.35 As practiced outside the United States, reprocess-ing
involves Chopping fuel rods into small pieces, leaching out the urani-um
oxide by nitric acid and applying suitable solvents to separate the ura-nium,
plutonium and fission products. The uranium and plutonium could
be reused as fuel. The fission products, which provide most of the radia-tion
and heat are mixed with pulverized glass, heated to melting, and
poured into a metal canister for solidification, safe storage, and ultimate
disposal or for industrial and medical uses.36 These fission products
33 McCutcheon, Chuck, Nevada’s Hill Delegation Stresses Transport Danger To Fight Nuclear
Waste Plan, Congressional Weekly (February 16, 2002).
34 Nuclear Information& Resources Services,Why We Call it Mobile Chernobyl,
http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/whywecallitmobilechernobyl.htm.
35 Murray, Raymond L. Nuclear Waste Management, Encyclopedia of Environmental Pollution
dn Cleanup (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999).
36 Ibid., 1120
The Worthless West 41
(cesium -137 and strontium-90) have significantly shorter half lives and are
rendered harmless due to decay in 300 years.
This is not a new solution to the problem, it was the original solution.
In fact, the belief that spent fuel could be recycled efficiently helped build
a case for commercialization of nuclear energy in the 1950’s. The problem
is that reprocessing was declared to be economically inefficient; it was
cheaper in the long run to rely on uranium reserves. Another reason why
the AEC supported commercial nuclear power is because it ensured a
ready supply of potential fuel for nuclear weapons. The prediction has
lived up to the promise. Hence the second, and more significant problem
with reprocessing. It is politically dangerous - it discharges too much
weapons grade plutonium into a politically unstable world.37
In the end, the system of nuclear power didn’t behave as AEC predicted.
We live with the consequences of that miscalculation today - 70,000 tons
of high level radioactive waste, and counting. Valerie Kuletz discussed this
miscalculation:
The reality is that the nuclear fuel cycle virtually from its inception has
been a spiral. It has been spiraling out of control because the Cycle exist-ed
only in the minds of its creators, who demanded that reality conform to
their ideal. The notion of a clean, efficient and replenishable source of
energy to fuel what they believed to be a natural economy of supply and
demand. By attempting to naturalize technology and the economy, humans
(Euroamericans) only demonstrate that they cannot control nature. The
power of the atom -the force within nature itself - unleashed cannot be put
back in the ground as though it had never been called forth to do our bid-ding.
38
Proceeding with the current plans to dispose of waste at Yucca
Mountain with or without the use of an interim storage facility in Utah or
anywhere else is like Putting the power of the atom... back in the ground.
But, what about the idea of the reprocessing cycle. Is it a myth, or is it
attainable?
The answer depends on the American public; you, me, and our neigh-bors.
We have to demand a real solution to the issue of nuclear waste.
Storage and disposal is not a real solution. The best alternative is to discon-tinue,
perhaps even outlaw further mining of uranium. And, instead of per-petuating
the government subsidy of creating more and more high-level
nuclear waste,we would then be subsidizing the recycling of that waste
into new fuel. Over 17 billion dollars has already been accumulated by a
tax on users of nuclear power to pay for disposal of nuclear waste.39 A
37 Kultez., 264.
38 Ibid., 281.
42 Crescat Scientia
portion of the money could be used to pay for the reprocessing or the tax
could be increased to cover the true cost of nuclear power.
This would require a change in policy. It would be a political decision.
But, it must be remembered that it was a political decision that ended the
policy of reprocessing in favor of disposal. The current classification sys-tem
for nuclear waste is a result of a political decision. The reality of urani-um
sold to twenty-eight foreign nations returning as high level nuclear
waste is the result of a political decision. The choice to bury the waste in
Nevada and the selection of Yucca Mountain is a political decision. And so
the question must be asked; who makes U.S. policy, the politicians or the
people who elect them? The burden lies on the public. It is simply not
enough to say no to nuclear waste. We must demand the safest and the
most scientifically sound decisions regarding nuclear waste, even if it is not
politically sound. We must be willing to accept, even demand the best
solution, not just the one that keeps nuclear waste out of our backyard.
The fate of the American Inter-desert West in the twentieth century was to
become the site of the majority of the United States nuclear programs. The
legacy of waste will linger for generations to come. The cycle culminated
with the selection of several sites in the deserts including Skull Valley and
Yucca Mountain to store and bury the most toxic wastes humans have cre-ated.
Yet, this pattern of sacrifice does not need to continue. Viable solu-tions
exist to keep the West from being further destroyed by senseless sac-rifice.
Some Americans have come to realize the West is not worthless.
Whether the deserts of the West continue to serve as the carpet under
which civilization sweeps its trash40 will be conditioned on the majority of
Americans realizing the West is not worthless, it has value and, it’s not
worth sacrificing. The fate of the American deserts in the twenty-first cen-tury
is in our hands.
39 Brown, Stewart F., How Do You Feel About Nuclear Power Now? Fortune,Vol. 145 Issue 5
(March 4, 2002).
40 Ward., 115.
The Worthless West 43
U T A H V A L L E Y S T A T E C O L L E G E
1 9 4 1
Although it happened several years ago, I remember the incident
clearly. It was the day I taught my, then five-year-old daughter about
racism. Jumping into our car after school, she pointed out a classmate and
announced,“I don’t like her.” She was pointing at the only African
American girl standing outside. I responded that she should never judge
someone based on his or her skin color. She looked at me with wide eyes
and I could tell I had her attention. I spent the rest of the short drive
home explaining how everyone is different, why it was important to be
nice to everyone, to include them, and so on. It is rare to keep a five-year-old’s
attention for so long. I was feeling quite proud of myself that her
intent gaze never strayed. As we pulled into the driveway, I, somewhat
smugly, asked,“Do you understand what mommy is trying to say?” She stat-ed
with some amazement,“I didn’t know her skin was different; I didn’t
like her because she spit on me at lunch.” I was stunned. I pictured the
next day,my little girl, at school,would be telling all of her classmates that
this little girl was different. I had planted the first seeds of racism in my
young daughter’s mind. I believe the incident stays fresh in my mind
because it forced me to question my beliefs. Could I be a racist?
What does it mean to be a racist? The conventional definition of
racism evokes images of white-hooded men burning crosses. I would sub-mit
different characteristics that should help to expose the insidious,
covert nature of racism. I regard one as a racist if they 1) support, either
actively or passively, white privilege, 2) have the power to be a racist,
therefore must be white, 3) and are generally convinced that they are not
racist. By this definition, I would challenge that racism affects every aspect
of every American’s life. Evidence of racism is found written into our law
books, taught throughout school curriculums, and woven into our lan-guage.
It is critical in the fight against racism in order to understand exact-
Understanding America’s
History with Racism
By: Kathy McCloud
46 Crescat Scientia
ly what it means to be a racist. When investigating racism, the journey
should begin with understanding racism’s synonym, white privilege.
White Privilege and Racism
Because white privilege is often countered with cries of reverse dis-crimination,
I will first offer a clear definition to what I refer when I speak
of white privilege. White privilege is a right, advantage, or immunity grant-ed
to, or enjoyed by the class of white persons beyond the common advan-tage
of all others; it is often an exemption of certain burden or liabilities.
This privilege, experienced exclusively by white-skinned people, has been
gained at the expense of every other minority. Recently this privilege has
begun to be investigated by modern writers.
Peggy McIntosh in her article “White Privilege: Unpacking the
Invisible Knapsack,” outlines 26 specific conditions wherein whites have
privilege over every other race. Her list ranges from the mundane, the abil-ity
to buy blemish cover or bandages in “flesh” color, to the serious, being
able to arrange protection for her children from people who might not
like them. McIntosh recognizes many areas of unearned privilege and con-cedes,“
The pressure to avoid it is great, for in facing it I must give up the
myth of meritocracy. If these things are true, this is not such a free coun-try…”
1 What does McIntosh mean by the phrase “the myth of meritocra-cy”?
Thomas Jefferson envisioned a society that had a “natural aristocracy”
or, as later called, a meritocracy. This would be a society that would natu-rally
stratify based on merit. If an individual worked hard toward a goal, it
would be achieved, regardless of class standing. This utopian idea was not
without its benefit to those who created it. By professing that a right to
leadership could be claimed through moral integrity, rather than by an
elect few with the right bloodline, opened a door that had long been
closed to the masses. The idea that man would achieve, and could achieve,
based on hard work and determination was a wonderful new framework
upon which to build a society.
The reality of the time, though,would suggest that this newly coined
meritocracy was not much different from the aristocracy from which the
colonizers had so recently been liberated. Certain large groups were still
excluded: African-Americans, Native-Americans, and women. The narrow
yardstick of lineage was replaced by the narrow yardstick of race and gen-der.
The privilege to rule would now be granted to white males regardless
of the content of their character. This fallacy of merit has always been the
1 Peggy McIntosh,“White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack,” Independent School,
Winter 1990.
America’s History with Racism 47
central problem with racism in our society. By facing this myth of meritoc-racy,
we can begin to look at the genuine reasons for success in America.
White privilege allows white individuals to believe that they have
reached the top of the ladder by hard work and determination while
assigning other explanations to minorities. For example, I recently worked
for a Latino plant manager. He was fair, direct, and a good decision-maker,
as well as a hard worker. One would be hard pressed to find someone
who did not have a tremendous amount of respect for him as a person and
a manager. Yet, when he came up in conversation, the comment was occa-sionally
made that he received the job because of Affirmative Action.
The incongruity between these two thought processes was lost on
those participating in the conversation, including myself. Was he in a lead-ership
position because he possessed all the qualities required and had the
experience or was he the token Latino needed for statistical purposes? All
evidence supports the former. It would seem then, even when minorities
achieve some amount of upward mobility, it remains socially acceptable to
reduce them to a “quota filled” status. It strips an individual of respect and
dignity.
Conversely, white privilege allows white men’s upward mobility to be
viewed as the reward of hard work, determination and dedication. Again,
the myth of meritocracy is reserved for those with white privilege.
Written and verbal language is a powerful tool to either dispel this myth or
reinforce it.
A recent article in Newsweek is an example of how language rein-forces
white privilege. Ellis Cose, in referring to the advisability of blacks
in the political arena, stated,“Blacks may have difficulty winning at the top
of the ticket, but there seem to be no particular barriers for black running
mates. For Republicans … black running mates can be a plus,‘inoculating’
white candidates against charges of racial insensitivity.”2 White privilege is
used here as a way to discount any achievement by a minority based on
their qualifications. They are simply a step in the white man’s ascent to
power.
Recently researchers at MIT and the University of Chicago tested the
premise that African-Americans may be rejected sight unseen by prospec-tive
employers.3 To prove this hypothesis, the researchers made up fake
job applications and attached resumes. The background and job experi-ences
were identical; the only change was in the name of the applicants.
They chose names slanted toward a white population (Kristens and Brads)
or toward an African-American population (Tamikas and Tyrones). The
2 Ellis Cose,“The Voices That Nobody Heard,” Newsweek, 18 November 2002, 47.
3 Kendall Clark,“The Real Distractions of Trent Lott,” 16 December 2002,
<http:www.whiteprivilege.com> 23 December 2002.
48 Crescat Scientia
researchers then sent out these applications to 5000 prospective employ-ers.
Those with “white-sounding” names were called for interviews 50%
more often than those with “minority-sounding” names. Again, this
research confirms the existence of the unfair advantage of white privilege
rather than the value of meritocracy.
Economic survival is not the only arena of white privilege. White priv-ilege
literally determines which population has the greater chance of